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I.  Introduction
The Federal Water Pollution Control
Act was enacted in 1972 expressly to elim-
inate “the discharge of pollutants into . . .
waters [of the United States]” by 1985 and
with the more modest, interim goal of
rendering all waterways suitable for fish,
shellfish and wildlife propagation and for
recreation by 1983.1 The Act explicitly
regulated major industrial dischargers
and sewage treatment plants.  Fifteen
years later America’s waterways were still
neither fishable nor swimmable.  In 1987
Congress amended the Act to include
Section 402(p), which explicitly regulates
discharges of storm water associated with
industrial and municipal activities.  In
Section 402(p), Congress forbade the dis-
charge of any rainwater that fell onto
industrial or municipal property without a
proper permit.  While dramatic, this
action was necessary to prevent the con-
tinued degradation of America’s waters
and achieve the initial goals of the CWA.
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1.  Federal Water Pollution Control Act, hereinafter
referred to as the Clean Water Act or the Act § 101,
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1),(2) (2003).  The interim 1983
goal is colloquially referred to as the “fishable
swimmable” goal.
The Act not only embodies lofty
goals, it also recognizes that those who
are affected by pollution have a keen
interest in seeing the law enforced.  To aid
enforcement, the Clean Water Act allows
individuals and organizations to act as
private attorneys general, suing to enforce
compliance when the government agen-
cies charged with enforcement fail to
enforce.  Violation of any “effluent stan-
dard or limitation” or “order issued . . .
with respect to such a standard or limita-
tion” is grounds for an enforcement
action.2 Effluent standards and limita-
tions are included in permits issued pur-
suant to the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (“NPDES”).3 There-
fore, individuals and organizations can
bring enforcement actions against dis-
chargers who violate any provision of an
NPDES permit.
Although Congress acknowledged
the need for private enforcement of the
Clean Water Act, the Act contains certain
limitations on “citizen” enforcement.  The
courts have increased the restrictions on
citizen enforcement powers.  For example,
unlike government enforcers, citizens can
only sue for violations that are ongoing at
the time the complaint is filed.4
Furthermore,  sixty days in advance of fil-
ing suit, a citizen enforcer must send a
notice of intent to sue to a discharger.5
This requirement hinders effective citizen
enforcement in part because conditions
often change during the sixty-day period in
response to the notice letter.  A savvy dis-
charger may dodge a meritorious enforce-
ment action by changing its behavior (but
still not complying with the Act) on the
last day of the notice period.  Plaintiffs
may send sixty-day letters that attempt to
account for a potential change in behavior.
This article will address the need for, and
validity of, such notice letters.
This article presents the case that
the courts have properly interpreted the
notice letter requirement and that the
requirement allows a plaintiff to give
adequate notice regardless of subse-
quent change in behavior by a discharg-
er.  The first section of this article exam-
ines Congressional intent behind the
notice requirement.  The second section
considers the evolution of judicial inter-
pretation of what constitutes adequate
notice.
The final section addresses the need
for and the validity of such notice letters,
so that a new sixty-day letter need not be
sent if a discharger alters its behavior dur-
ing the notice period.  This section will also
illustrate the state of the law by applying it
to four hypothetical situations.6
II.  Purpose of Notice 
Citizens have always had the right to
sue a discharger who violates the Clean
Water Act or any permit issued pursuant
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2.  Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
3.  See id. § 505(e).
4.  Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 63 (1987).
5.  Id. § 505(b).
6.  This article does not address the validity of a
truly anticipatory notice letter, for example, where
a plaintiff who is alerted to a planned discharge
wants to secure an injunction on the day the dis-
charge begins might send a notice letter 60 days in
advance of the first discharge.
to the Act, 7 but this right is checked by
the condition that “[no] action may be
commenced . . . prior to sixty days after
the plaintiff has given notice of the
alleged violation (1) to the Administrator,
(ii) to the State in which the alleged viola-
tion occurs, and (iii) to any alleged viola-
tor of the standard . . . .”8
The original purpose of the notice
requirement was to ensure that citizens
suits were supplementing, not supplanti-
ng agency enforcement; the 1971 Senate
Committee report explained this inten-
tion as follows:
[i]n order to further encourage
and provide for agency enforce-
ment, . . .  prior to filing a petition
with the court, a citizen or group
of citizens would first have to
serve notice of intent to file such
action on the Federal and State
water pollution control agency
and the alleged polluter.  Each
citizen or group would have to
include facts in such notice in
accordance with regulations pre-
scribed by the Administrator.9
More concisely, “[t]he time between
notice and filing of the action should give
the administrative enforcement office an
opportunity to act on the alleged viola-
tion.”10
The Act requires EPA to promulgate
regulations outlining the elements
required in a sixty- day notice letter.11 The
1971 Senate Committee report provides
guidance on what Congress envisioned:
. . . [S]uch regulations should reflect sim-
plicity, clarity, and standardized form.  The
regulations should not require notice that
places impossible or unnecessary bur-
dens on citizens but rather should be con-
fined to requiring information necessary
to give a clear indication of the citizens’
intent.  These regulations might require
information regarding the identity and
location of alleged polluter, a brief
description of the activity alleged to be in
violation, and the provision of law alleged
to be violated.12
In addition to the explicit function of
allowing regulators to step in to enforce
the Act, the Supreme Court has interpret-
ed the notice provision to serve an implic-
it function of allowing a discharger to
come into compliance before a citizen
may commence its suit.  In Gwaltney, the
Court wrote that 
If the Administrator or the State
commences enforcement action
within that sixty-day period, the
citizen suit is barred, presumably
because governmental action has
rendered it unnecessary.  §
1365(b) (1)(B).  It follows logically
that the purpose of notice to the
alleged violator is to give it an
opportunity to bring itself into
complete compliance with the Act
and thus likewise render unneces-
sary a citizen suit.13
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7.  Citizen enforcement has been a feature of the
Clean Water Act since it was enacted in 1972.
Modeled on the citizen suit provision in the Clean
Air Act, section 505 of the Clean Water Act gives
citizens the right to sue for any violation of an
effluent limitation.  Id. § 1365(a).
8.  Id. at § 1365(b).
9.  S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 3745 (1971).
10.  Id.
11.  33 U.S.C. 1365(b).
12.  S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 3745.
13.  Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49 at 59-60.
The premise that notice must serve these
two functions has become entrenched in
case law.14 In reality, the notice provi-
sions serve at least three functions.  As
observed by the Northern District of
California in Friends of Frederick Seig
Grove No. 94 v. Sonoma County Water
Agency et al.,
there appear to be three separate
functions of the notice require-
ment. First, it alerts the appropri-
ate agencies to the purported vio-
lations so that those agencies can
decide whether to pursue admin-
istrative enforcement (the
enforcement function). Second, it
gives the alleged violator a
chance to voluntarily comply with
the CWA before facing adminis-
trative or judicial action (the com-
pliance function). Third, it gives
both the regulatory entities and
the alleged violators an opportu-
nity to discuss a potential settle-
ment with all of the interested
plaintiffs (the settlement func-
tion). The net result of these three
functions - enforcement, compli-
ance, and settlement - is to
reduce the burden on federal
courts by obviating the need for a
citizen suit.”15
III.  Notice Requirements
Section 1365(b) of the Clean Water
Act delegates authority to the EPA to set
notice requirements.  These requirements
appear in section 135.3(a) of the Code of
Federal Regulations:
Notice regarding an alleged viola-
tion of an effluent standard or
limitation or of an order with
respect thereto, shall include suf-
ficient information to permit the
recipient to identify (1) the specif-
ic standard, limitation, or order
alleged to have been violated; (2)
the activity alleged to constitute a
violation; (3) the person or per-
sons responsible for the alleged
violation; (4) the location of the
alleged violation; (5) the date or
dates of such violation; and (6)
the full name, address and tele-
phone number of the person giv-
ing notice.16
Many environmental statutes contain
notice requirements similar to those in
the Clean Water Act.  Courts interpret
those requirements similarly.17 The
Supreme Court definitively interpreted
the notice requirements in a case under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (“RCRA”), in which the plaintiffs failed
to give any notice to the EPA or the appro-
priate state agency.18 The plaintiffs in this
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14.  See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20,
29 (1989); Washington Trout v. McCain Foods, Inc.,
45 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1995); Atlantic States
Legal Found., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116
F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir. 1997); Community
Association for Restoration of the Environment v.
Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir.
2002);  San Francisco BayKeeper v. Tosco Corp.,
309 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002).
15.  Friends of Frederick Seig Grove, 124 F. Supp.
2d 1161, 1167 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
16.  40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a) (2003) (internal numbering
added.). See also Clean Water Act § 505(b).
17.  Washington Trout, 45 F.3d at 1353, n.3.
18.  Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 33.
case, Hallstrom, owned a dairy farm that
was located next to the county landfill in
Tillamook County, Oregon.19 Plaintiffs
sent a sixty-day notice letter to Tillamook
County, but not to the State of Oregon or
the EPA.20 Plaintiffs filed suit, and defen-
dants moved to dismiss on the basis that
notice was inadequate.  Plaintiffs sent
notice to the requisite agencies one day
after the motion to dismiss was filed,
attempting to cure their inadequate
notice.21 The Court held that courts lack
the authority to interpret the basic notice
requirements in a flexible or pragmatic
way because “the notice and 60 day delay
requirements are mandatory conditions
precedent to commencing suit under the 
. . . citizen suit provision; a district court
may not disregard these requirements at
its discretion.”22
The lower courts have interpreted
Hallstrom to require strict compliance with
the notice requirements, but they differ
on the meaning of strict compliance.  The
cases establish that a notice letter must
meet each of the six elements set out in
40 CFR 135.3(a) for a plaintiff to pursue an
enforcement action under the CWA.23 For
example, an early Ninth Circuit case,
Washington Trout, involved a notice letter
that alleged discharges by a potato pro-
cessing plant without a permit.24 The
notice failed to include the names and
telephone numbers of the plaintiffs.25 It
also failed to identify the dates of viola-
tion beyond indicating that the “pollution
is substantial, longstanding, and continu-
ing.”26 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court’s dismissal based on failure to
identify the plaintiffs. Washington Trout is
often cited for the proposition that every
notice element must be included in the
notice letter.27 However, the Court did not
reach the question of whether the notice
adequately identified dates of violation,28
choosing instead to affirm the district
court’s dismissal only on the basis of fail-
ure to identify the plaintiffs.29
The same year as Washington Trout, the
Third Circuit addressed how much infor-
mation regarding the nature of violations
must be included in a notice letter in
Public Interest Research Group (“PIRG”) v.
Hercules, Inc.30 The plaintiffs’ notice letter
in Hercules identified sixty-eight discharge
violations from April 1985 through
February 1989.31 The complaint, however,
included eighty-seven discharge viola-
tions, most of which had occurred prior to
the notice.32 Plaintiffs later added addi-
tional discharge violations as well as hun-
dreds of monitoring, reporting, and
record-keeping violations.33 The district
court granted judgment for the defendant
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19.  Id. at 23.
20.  Id. at 23-24.
21.  Id.
22.  Id. at 31.  Based on this language, courts have
concluded that notice requirements are to be
treated as jurisdictional and not merely part of a
plaintiff’s case in chief.
23.  See, e.g. Washington Trout, 45 F.3d at 1352 n.3.
24.  Id. at 1352.
25.  Id.
26.  Id. at 1352, n.2.
27.  See, e.g., California Sportfishing Protection
Alliance v. City of West Sacramento, 905 F. Supp.
792,  799-800 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
28.  Id.
29.  Id. at 1354-1355.
30.  50 F.3d 1239 (3rd Cir. 1995).
31.  Id. at 1242.
32.  Id. at 1243.
33.  Id.
on all pre-complaint discharge violations
that were not listed in the notice letter,
reasoning that notice was not adequate
with respect to those violations.  The
court also granted judgment to the defen-
dant for all monitoring, reporting, and
record keeping violations because the
notice letter had made no mention of
those kinds of violation.34
The Third Circuit rejected the district
court’s holding that the regulation
required the notice to “identify every pre-
complaint date on which there was an
excess discharge of a designated pollu-
tant.”
We read the regulation to require
just what it says: that the citizen
provide enough information to
enable the recipient . . . to identi-
fy the specific effluent discharge
limitation which has been violat-
ed, including the parameter vio-
lated, the date of the violation,
the outfall at which it occurred,
and the person or persons
involved.35
The court noted that agencies were at
least in as good a position a the citizen
plaintiff to identify violations of the same
type.  Thus, requiring agencies to identify
each violation would unduly impede citi-
zen suits.36
The court concluded that a notice
that identifies an excessive discharge also
provides notice of a monitoring violation
for that effluent because “in investigating
one aspect of a parameter violation, such
as a discharge, the other aspects of that
violation, for instance monitoring, report-
ing, and record keeping requirements for
that parameter, will of necessity come
under scrutiny.37 The court then conclud-
ed that it was unnecessary for the notice
to take account of each individual viola-
tion of a specific discharge limitation:
For example, if a permit holder
has discharged pollutant “x” in
excess of the permitted effluent
limit five times in a month but the
citizen has learned only of four
violations, the citizen will give
notice of the four violations of
which the citizen then has knowl-
edge but should be able to
include the fifth violation in the
suit when it is discovered.38
The Third Circuit held that “a notice
letter which includes a list of discharge
violations, by parameter, provides suffi-
cient information for the recipients of the
notice to identify violations of the same
type (same parameter, same outfall)
occurring during and after the period cov-
ered by the notice letter.39
Shortly after Washington Trout and
Hercules, the Eastern District of California
was confronted with the question of ade-
quacy of notice in a case involving chron-
ic violations of a discharge permit at a
sewage treatment plant operated by the
City of West Sacramento.  The plaintiff,
California Sportfishing Protective Alliance
(CSPA), gave notice that the City was vio-
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34.  Id. at 1244.
35.  Id. at 1248.
36.  See id. at 1248-1249.
37.  Id. at 1248.
38.  Id.
39.  Id. at 1250.
lating its permit and the Act, and that “On
March 24, 1994, the California Regional
Water Quality Control Board notified you
of chlorine violations, non-reporting, that
bioassay samples were ‘scrubbed,’ that
uniform organisms exceeded the effluent
limitation, and that solid waste were
observed over the Sacramento River
Bank.”40 The notice also stated that “[f]or
the previous five years on hundreds of
occasions you have violated your NPDES
permit. Further, you have consistently
misreported and/or failed to report the
results of your testings.”41
In granting defendant’s motion to
dismiss, the district court reasoned that
“the date or dates of the violation must be
stated with some specificity.  Ideally
plaintiff will identify the precise date.  But
at the least plaintiff should give a range as
to date that is reasonably limited.”42 The
court then concluded that 
the notice letter fails to comply
with the regulation because it is
vague as to which portions of the
permit have been violated and
which test results were not
reported or were misreported.
‘The previous five years on hun-
dreds of occasions’ does not give
sufficient notice of the date or
dates on which the violations are
alleged to have occurred.43
The court held that a notice letter cannot
simply allege that violations occurred
within a broad period of time with no
additional information, and that CSPA’s
notice, which merely alleged violations
over a five-year range with no additional
limitations, failed to satisfy the notice
requirement.44
The CSPA case is significant because
the court was interpreting two elements of
the notice requirements that at the time
had not been tested in the Ninth Circuit:
the levels of specificity required in identi-
fying the dates of violation and the specif-
ic standard or order violated.  The CSPA
court rejected the approach taken by the
Hercules court, which attempted to give
meaning to the regulation’s requirement
that the notice include “sufficient infor-
mation to permit the recipient to identify”
each necessary element.45 The CSPA
court instead interpreted the Ninth
Circuit’s Washington Trout decision as
requiring a notice letter to actually identi-
fy all elements of notice.46
Other district courts subsequently
rejected this “narrow interpretation” theo-
ry, choosing instead to read the entire reg-
ulation and give meaning to the portion of
40 CFR 135.3(a) that specifies a notice let-
ter must “permit the recipient to identify”
the violations.  For example, the court in
Friends of Frederick Seig Grove upheld an
action with regard to certain violations, in
which plaintiff sent a notice indicating
that the defendants’ self-monitoring
reports contained all the information nec-
essary to determine the violations to be
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40.  California Sportfishing Protection Alliance v.
City of West Sacramento, 905 F. Supp. 792, 799-800
(E.D. Cal. 1995).
41.  Id. at 800.
42.  Id. at 799.
43.  Id. at 800.
44.  See id.
45.  See id. at 799. 
46.  Id.
alleged.47 The notice listed numerous
violations of the provisions of the NPDES
permit, but it failed to specifically identify
the dates on which any of the alleged vio-
lations occurred.  The court cited to state-
ments in the notice stating that violations
of the NPDES permit “‘are evidenced in . . .
[the defendants’] self monitoring data’
submitted to the Regional Board.”48 As
support, the court again pointed to the
notice, stating that “[t]he notice also cov-
ered ‘any and all violations which may
have occurred but for which data may not
have been available or submitted or
apparent from the face of the report or
data submitted by [OCSD] to the Regional
Board.”49
In the Frederick Seig Grove case, the
“notice listed 326 violations of the provi-
sions of the NPDES permit [at issue], but
it failed to specifically identify the dates
on which any of the alleged violations
occurred.”50 Despite this observation, the
court held that, because the defendant
and administrative agencies had access to
the self-monitoring reports, they were suf-
ficiently notified of the dates of viola-
tion.51 However, with respect to viola-
tions that were identified only as “any and
all violations that were not apparent from
the reports,” the court found notice to be
inadequate, reasoning that
The court is mindful of the princi-
ples established in Hallstrom and
Washington Trout and recognizes
that the citizen suit notice provi-
sion must be interpreted and
applied strictly. However, requir-
ing a plaintiff to specifically list
all of the alleged violations and
the precise dates of each viola-
tion in a notice letter is inconsis-
tent with the balance Congress
sought to strike between encour-
aging citizen enforcement of envi-
ronmental regulations and avoid-
ing burdening the federal courts
with a flood of citizen suits. The
enforcement, compliance, and
settlement functions promoted
by the notice requirement are not
advanced by such a strict inter-
pretation of the CWA notice regu-
lation. Indeed, placing such a bur-
den on prospective plaintiffs
would excessively undermine citi-
zen suits and discourage alleged
violators from complying with the
CWA or entering into settlement
discussions with plaintiffs.52
Since Washington Trout, the Ninth
Circuit has reconsidered its interpretation
of CWA notice requirements in three
important decisions: Natural Resources
Defense Council et al. v. Southwest Marine, Inc.,
Community Association for Restoration of the
Environment v. Henry Bosma Dairy et al., and
San Francisco BayKeeper v. Tosco.53 Each of
these cases clarifies that while the six
essential elements must be present in a
sixty-day notice letter, the notice need not
provide the information, but merely
enough guidance for the recipients to
ascertain the information.
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47.  Friends of Frederick Seig Grove No. 94 v.
Sonoma County Water Agency et al., 124 F. Supp.
2d 1161 (N.D. Cal 2000).
48.  Id. at 1164.
49.  Id.
50.  Id.
51.  Id. at 1169.
52.  Id.
53.  Southwest Marine, 236 F.3d 985; Bosma, 305
F.3d. 943; Tosco, 309 F.3d 1153.
A.  Natural Resources Defense Council
v. Southwest Marine, Inc.
Southwest Marine provided the first
clear refutation of the proposition, adopt-
ed by some courts citing Washington Trout,
that a notice letter must contain all infor-
mation on which an enforcement action
would be based.54 Defendant Southwest
Marine operated a shipyard that dis-
charged pollutants to San Diego Bay.55
The company secured an NPDES permit
for its operations in 1991, but failed to
fully comply with the permit’s require-
ments to develop and implement an ade-
quate storm water pollution prevention
plan (“SWPPP”) and a monitoring plan
that would accurately measure the facili-
ty’s discharges.56 Natural Resources
Defense Council (“NRDC”) sent notice of
these violations, and less than a week
prior to the expiration of the 60 day peri-
od, Southwest Marine revised its SWPPP
and monitoring plan.57 NRDC did not
send a new notice, and instead filed suit
in reliance on the original notice letter.58
The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing
that the notice was inadequate, the dis-
trict court denied the motion, and the
defendant appealed.59
The defendant argued that the notice
letter was inadequate because it did not
mention NRDC’s claim that the defendant
had failed to implement the “good house-
keeping” requirements of the SWPPP.60
The Ninth Circuit noted that the notice
letter mentioned only a failure to “imple-
ment an adequate SWPPP, including a
‘good housekeeping’ provision.61 On the
date the notice was sent, the SWPPP had
not included housekeeping measures.
There was no way for the notice to specif-
ically identify the SWPPP’s non-existent
“good housekeeping” measure.62 The
Ninth Circuit held that “the notice letter
was sufficient on the date it was mailed,
to allow the district court to exercise juris-
diction over Plaintiffs’ ‘good housekeep-
ing’ claims.”63 On the day the notice was
mailed, Southwest Marine was operating
under a storm water permit that required
Southwest Marine to develop and imple-
ment a SWPPP that included a “good
housekeeping” provision.64 “Plaintiffs’
notice letter sufficiently alleged that
Southwest Marine had failed to prepare
and implement such a plan.”65 The Ninth
Circuit found support for its holding in the
fact that Southwest Marine had amended
its SWPPP to include a section addressing
housekeeping in response to the notice
letter, and thus had understood the notice
letter.66
The court then considered whether
changes to a discharger’s activities after a
notice letter can invalidate a notice let-
ter.67 The court concluded that such
changes do not affect the adequacy of
notice properly given at the outset.68 The
court observed that 
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54.  See Southwest Marine, 236 F.3d at 985.
55.  Id. at 991.
56.  Id. at 992
57.  Id.
58.  See id.
59.  Id. at 992-993.
60.  Id. at 996.
61.  Id.
62.  Id.
63.  Id. at 997.
64.  Id.
65.  Id.
66.  Id.
67.  See id.
68.  Id.
[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is
established by providing a notice
that is adequate on the date it is
given to the defendant. The
defendant’s later changes to its
operations and plans may affect
standing . . . the question of
ongoing violations or remedies . . .
or mootness . . . But such changes
do not retroactively divest a dis-
trict court of jurisdiction under 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b).69
The Ninth Circuit further affirmed the
district court’s holding that specific dates
and locations cannot be required for fail-
ure to develop and implement an ade-
quate SWPPP and monitoring plan,
because these violations occur every day
throughout the area of operations.70 This
decision signaled the the shift away from
notice letter requirements more burden-
some than Congress intended.
B.  Community Association for
Restoration of the Environment v.
Henry Bosma Dairy et al.
Two years later, the Ninth Circuit
moved even further away from requiring
very specific information in a notice let-
ter.71 In Community Association for
Restoration of the Environment (“CARE”)
v. Henry Bosma Dairy et al., the court held
that even though the notice identified
fewer than half of the violations listed in
the complaint, it was adequate because
the non-identified violations were of the
same type as those that were listed.72
The facts were compelling. The
defendant, a dairy, repeatedly refused
requests by the permitting agency to seek
permit coverage, and then failed to com-
ply with its permit for many years, despite
many notices of violation by the agency.73
In October 1997, the plaintiff, CARE, sent
a notice letter that alleged violations of
the general NPDES permit governing dairy
operations for the previous five years.74 At
that time the dairy owner had secured
permit coverage for one of the dairies at
issue, and in January 1998, he secured
coverage for another of the dairies.75 The
complaint alleged that Bosma’s opera-
tions discharged in violation of a general
permit governing dairy operations, and
listed numerous dates of violation that
were not included in its notice letter.76
CARE prevailed at trial, and Bosma
appealed after imposition of a penalty for
violations.77
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit took the
opportunity to conduct a thorough survey
of notice law to date.  The court observed
that “Hallstrom did not speak directly to
the issue of what constitutes sufficient
notice under the applicable regulation,”
but that several courts had extrapolated
from Hallstrom that the notice require-
ments must be strictly construed.78 In
CARE, the Ninth Circuit specifically noted
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69.  Id.
70.  See id. at 997-998.
71.  305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002).
72.  Id. at 956.
73.  Id. at 947-948.
74.  Id. at 948.
75.  Id. at 947.
76.  Id. at 948-949.
77.  Id. at  949.
78.  See id. at 950.
the explicit facts of Washington Trout and
CSPA.79
The court then observed that in
Hercules, 
[t]he Third Circuit, the only circuit
to have considered the adequacy
of a citizen-suit notice which
failed to include additional viola-
tions listed in the complaint . . . ,
held that a citizen plaintiff’s initial
notice of discharge violations was
broad enough to encompass
additional discharge, monitoring,
reporting, and record keeping vio-
lations occurring during and after
the date of the notice letter.80
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the rea-
soning in Hercules and held that although
the notice must be sufficient to allow the
recipients to identify the basis for the
complaint, “the citizen is not required to
list every specific aspect or detail of every
alleged violation.  Nor is the citizen
required to describe every ramification of
a violation.”81 Hercules’ “overall sufficien-
cy” approach focused on the purpose of
the notice requirement: “to provide the
recipient with effective, as well as timely
notice.”82 As in Hercules, the complaint in
Bosma listed violations that were not
specifically listed in the notice.83 As in
Hercules, the court concluded that the
notice was legally sufficient because it
enabled the recipient to ascertain the req-
uisite information.84 The Ninth Circuit
held that the notice letter in Bosma ade-
quately alerted the recipients to the viola-
tive discharges, even though it identified
some dates but not others which were
then listed in the complaint.85
C. BayKeeper v. Tosco
In San Francisco BayKeeper v. Tosco, the
Ninth Circuit again addressed the ques-
tion of whether changed circumstances
invalidate an otherwise valid notice let-
ter.86 The case examined the level of
specificity required for a notice to identify
dates of violation adequately.87 At the
time BayKeeper sent notice, Tosco operat-
ed a petroleum coke facility in Pittsburg,
California near New York Slough, a water
of the United States.88 Baykeeper alleged
that large piles of petroleum coke sat
uncovered at the facility, and coke was
discharged by storm water and wind into
the Slough.89 Baykeeper also alleged that
coke escaped the facility during boat load-
ing and unloading operations.90
BayKeeper sent a notice letter to
Tosco that stated BayKeeper’s intention to
sue for discharges occurring when pollu-
tants were carried directly into New York
Slough and when storm water mingled
with pollutants and discharged from the
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80. Id. [citations omitted.]
81.  PIRG v. Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d 1239, 1248 (3rd
Cir. 1995).
82. Id.; Atlantic States Legal Found. Inc. v. Stroh
Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir. 1997)
(stating that the notice must be sufficiently
detailed to allow the alleged violator to know what
it is doing wrong so that it will know what correc-
tive actions will prevent a lawsuit).
83.  Bosma, 305 F.3d at 951.
84. Id. at 951-953.
85. Id.
86.  Tosco, 309 F.3d at 1153.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1155.
89. Id.
90. Id.
facility.91 On Tosco’s motion to dismiss,
the District Court found the notice letter
sufficient in all respects, except for the
specificity of the dates of some viola-
tions.92
BayKeeper’s letter notified Tosco that
it intended to sue for two types of “direct”
discharges of coke: (1) coke spilled during
ship loading, and (2) coke blown by the
wind into the water from uncovered
piles.93 The notice letter stated somewhat
tautologically that the loading violations
occurred “on each day on which [the]
loading operations have taken place.”94
The notice letter listed fourteen dates in
1998 and 1999 on which Coast Guard
records showed that ships were docked at
the Tosco facility.95 It also alleged that the
wind-blown violations took place “on each
day when the wind has been sufficiently
strong to blow coke from the piles into the
slough.”96 The notice did not specify how
many days the wind was strong enough to
blow coke from the piles into the
slough.97 It also did not cite to Coast
Guard records, or any other records from
which Tosco might have deduced the
dates of discharge.98
In addition to direct discharges from
spills and wind, the notice alleged that
Tosco was responsible for storm water
pollution.99 According to BayKeeper, rain
came into contact with uncovered coke
piles and either carried contaminants
directly into the slough, or into the storm
drain system which flowed into the
slough.100 BayKeeper provided a list of
dates between 1994 and 1999 when the
San Francisco Bay area received more
than one-tenth of an inch of rain as dates
when stormwater discharge would have
occurred.101
The Ninth Circuit upheld the suffi-
ciency of the notice with regard to storm
water violations with almost no discus-
sion. Citing Southwest Marine, the court
held that mere failure to implement best
available storm water control technology
constitutes a daily, ongoing violation.102
The court was more interested in the
question of whether notice was adequate
with respect to discharges during loading
and discharges of wind-blown pollu-
tants.103
Building on Bosma, the court in Tosco
observed that the operator of a facility is
in a far better position than a plaintiff to
identify the dates on which it conducted
loading operations.104 The court rea-
soned that:
[t]he notice regulation does not
require BayKeeper in such a situ-
ation to provide the exact dates of
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95. Id.
96. Id.
97.  See Id.
98.  See Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also San Francisco Baykeeper v. Tosco
Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2001),
in which the district court dismissed the case
against Tosco as moot as a result of Tosco selling
the facility seven months after San Francisco
Baykeeper filed suit. The Ninth Circuit, in Tosco, 309
F.3d. 1153, overturned this mootness holding
before making its decision. 
102.  Id. at 1159.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1158.
alleged violations; rather, it
requires only that BayKeeper pro-
vide “sufficient information to per-
mit the recipients to identify . . . the
date or dates.” 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a)
(emphasis added). Given the
knowledge that Tosco already
had, BayKeeper’s letter was spe-
cific enough to notify Tosco of the
nature of the alleged violations,
as well as the likely dates of those
violations.105
The court held that BayKeeper’s alle-
gation that coke spilled into the slough on
each day of ship loading, even on days for
which BayKeeper did not provide specific
dates, was sufficiently specific to fulfill its
notice obligation.106
The court then considered whether
BayKeeper provided Tosco with adequate
notice that it was responsible for illegal
discharges “on each day when the wind
has been sufficiently strong to blow coke
from the piles into the slough.”107
BayKeeper provided only a five year range
of dates for these violations, indicating
that a violation occurred every time the
coke piles were uncovered and the wind
blew strongly enough to move coke from
the piles into the slough.108 Citing
Southwest Marine, the court held that
BayKeeper’s notice was “sufficiently spe-
cific to inform [Tosco] about what it [was]
doing wrong” and to allow Tosco to cor-
rect the problem by enclosing its coke
piles prior to the onset of litigation.109
In summary, the Ninth Circuit is tak-
ing the lead nationwide in moving notice
jurisprudence to give meaning to the
entire governing regulation.  Notice deci-
sions since Southwest Marine make clear
that notice must be sufficiently specific to
allow the recipient to determine the stan-
dards that the citizen alleges were violat-
ed, as well as the dates when the citizen
alleges those violations occurred.  These
decisions conclusively reject the highly
restrictive interpretation of Washington
Trout expressed by the Eastern District
Court in CSPA, and embrace the Third
Circuit’s approach in Hercules.  In its inter-
pretation, the Ninth Circuit is faithful to
the plain text of the Act and is accurately
implementing Congress’ intent with
respect to the notice requirement.
D.  Notice Must Still Provide
Information Sufficient to Allow the
Recipient to Identify the Standard
or Limitation that is Violated
Potential citizen-plaintiffs must
remember that complete notice is still
required, and that notice must satisfy all
elements elaborated in 40 CFR
122.35.3(a). As the Ninth Circuit observed
in ONRC Action et al. v. Columbia Plywood,
Inc., a notice letter that specifies the type
of violation for which a plaintiff intends to
sue will not later be read to include other
types of violations that were not speci-
fied.110 In ONRC, the letter notified recip-
ients that “Columbia Plywood had been
discharging pollutants into the Klamath
River without a valid NPDES permit since
November 30, 1989.”111 The letter stated
that Columbia Plywood’s permit was
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108. Id.  The piles’ default condition was to be uncovered.
109. Id. (citation omitted).
110.  286 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2002).
111. Id. at 1140.
invalid because the discharger had not
applied to renew its permit within the
time period allotted for application.  The
letter specified:
Attached as Exhibit A to this
Notice is a copy of Columbia
Plywood Corporation’s Renewal
Application, indicating its filing
by Oregon DEQ on August 21,
1989. Further, the application was
signed on August 29, 1989. Both
dates are not within the 180 days
prior to expiration of Columbia
Plywood Corporation’s NPDES
permit on November 30, 1989
required by OAR 340-045-0030.
Therefore, the permit application
is not timely filed by state law
and not qualified for the ongoing
discharge exemption for expired
permits.112
The Ninth Circuit noted that “no
other defects in the permit, or related to
the permit, were specified.113 The com-
plaint requested relief addressing three
topics: failure to apply for a permit renew-
al more than 180 days prior to expiration
of the permit, lack of power on the part of
the permitting authority to extend a per-
mit without renewing it, and failure to
reapply for permit renewal five years after
the initial renewal application.114 The
court concluded that the notice was valid
only with respect to the first claim,
because the recipients would not have
been able to deduce from the notice letter
that plaintiffs intended to sue on the sec-
ond and third bases.115
In dissent, Judge Reinhardt interpret-
ed the majority opinion to say that the
notice was inadequate because it identi-
fied one violation, but not other related
violations.116
Judge Reinhardt’s interpretation
would put the ONRC case in direct con-
flict with the holdings in Southwest Marine
and CARE v. Bosma, in which unidentified
dates of violation that were similar in type
to identified dates of violation were
actionable.
This dissenting opinion interprets
the majority opinion to be far more
sweeping than it is.  The majority opinion
deals with the requirement that notice
provide sufficient information to allow the
recipient to identify the rule or regulation
alleged to have been violated.  The court
did not dismiss unidentified dates of the
same type of violation.  Rather, the court
adhered to the rule that plaintiffs may
only sue over the types of violations
specifically stated in the notice letter. The
notice identifies one rule, the 180-day
requirement, quite specifically.  The plain-
tiffs do not specify any other types of vio-
lations in their notice letter.  With such a
specific rule identified, it would be hard to
argue that ONRC was on notice of other
unrelated rules that were being violated.
Therefore, the court correctly concluded
that violation of the 180-day rule is the
only type of violation for which the notice
was adequate.  For this reason, the major-
ity opinion does not conflict with other
recent decisions.
Despite the clear direction of notice
jurisprudence, one recent District Court
case specifically ruled against the validity
162
W
ES
T 

N
O
R
TH
W
ES
T
Shana Lazerow Volume 9, Number 2
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115.  See id. at 1143.
116. Id. at 1145.
of an anticipatory notice letter.  Unlike the
other notice cases and hypotheticals con-
sidered in this article, which derive from
suits brought under the Clean Water Act,
this case dealt with a notice of intent to
sue for alleged violations of the
Endangered Speies Act (“ESA”). The hold-
ing is nonetheless interesting for an
analysis of the notice requirement.  The
unpublished decision, Kern County Farm
Bureau v. Badgley, interprets the notice
requirement under the Endangered
Species Act (“ESA”), which provides that a
citizen may bring suit against the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) upon ade-
quate notice.117 There is no parallel right
for citizens to sue the government under
the other environmental statutes like the
Clean Water Act or the Clean Air Act, so
the analysis is, and should be, quite dif-
ferent.  The case arose out of a FWS deci-
sion to list the Buena Vista Lake shrew as
an endangered species.  FWS propounded
its draft listing decision, and after the
comment period closed, the Farm Bureau
sent a notice letter stating its intention to
sue.  During the sixty-day period the FWS
issued its final listing decision.  The Farm
Bureau sued, and the District Court dis-
missed the case, holding that 
to allow citizen enforcers to sub-
mit all-encompassing, detailed
notices of intent to sue prior to
the Secretary’s taking any action
which violates section 1533 of the
ESA would undermine the pur-
pose of the sixty-day notice provi-
sion. The court finds in particular
that the fact that a premature
notice forecasts a violation that
actually appears in a final rule
promulgated by the Secretary
does not change the fact that one
cannot give notice of a violation
which has not yet happened.118
The district court distinguished
Southwest Marine, explaining that it was
neither controlling nor even analogous to
the present facts.  The court observe that
a true analogy to Southwest Marine would
occur where FWS issues a final listing rule
and then, during the sixty-day period,
issues a new final listing rule.119
The distinctions between Southwest
Marine and Kern County Farm Bureau are
greater than the district court observed.
First, the notice was a causal factor in the
change in Southwest Marine whereas the
FWS was under an administrative sched-
ule to make the change it made.  Second,
the Kern County defendants (FWS) were
required by law to list the endangered
species;  however, a discharger of pollution
is not required by law to pollute - in fact, a
discharger may only do so under the
parameters of the Act.  While obvious, the
distinction between an action required by
law, in which the defendant has no choice,
and one that is wholly discretionary (such
as operating an industrial site that dis-
charges storm water) is extremely impor-
tant in deciding whether a given notice let-
ter achieves the legislative purpose behind
the notice requirements.
These distinctions turn on and clear-
ly affect whether the purposes of notice
are achieved with an enforcement action.
A change that occurs in response to a
notice letter shows that the alleged viola-
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See also Endangered Species Act §11, 16 U.S.C. §
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118.  Badgley, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23125, *36-37.
119. Id. at *36.
tor understands the basis on which the
plaintiff intends to sue, as the violator is
demonstrating its intention to avoid suit
after the sixty-day period.  The same can-
not be said in a situation like the FWS list-
ing decision, which operates on an
administrative schedule.  Also, the pur-
pose of the ESA is to protect species
through the listing process, so citizen
suits to prevent listings impede rather
than advance the goals of the statute.  By
contrast, by undertaking a Clean Water
Act enforcement action against a dis-
charger, citizens advance the purpose of
the Act - to eliminate pollutant discharge.  
Finally, the FWS routinely receives
and responds to public comments to its
draft rule. It is thus fully alerted and must
respond to comments prior to issuing its
final rule.  A notice letter sent regarding a
draft rule cannot serve to actually notify
the FWS that it is going to be sued over its
final rule, because the presumption is
that the final rule has not yet been prom-
ulgated and that the public comments will
affect the final outcome.
IV. Application of The Evolving 
Notice Requirements to Four 
Clean Water Act Situations
As the law currently stands, a Clean
Water Act notice letter that gives suffi-
cient information for a discharger to iden-
tify the standard being violated and dates
of violation will stand, even if those ele-
ments are not specifically stated in the
letter itself.120 This is also the interpreta-
tion that makes the notice requirements
most effective.  The less rigidly the notice
requirements are interpreted, the more
likely notice letters are to secure settle-
ment, compliance, or government
enforcement, the results the notice letter
is supposed to achieve.
From the settlement perspective, the
less money and time a plaintiff must
invest in the notice letter, the less money
a plaintiff must recover in a settlement,
and the easier it is to settle a case.  When
preparing a notice letter necessitates
investigation more rigorous than that
required for filing a complaint, a plaintiff
must gather information without the ben-
efit of discovery mechanisms and from
sources other than the discharger, which
is extremely inefficient.
From the perspective of discharger
compliance, a more minimal notice letter,
which provides sufficient information for
the discharger to deduce the nature of
violations but does not actually state the
violations, should result in better long
term compliance.  A discharger who actu-
ally investigates the process and compli-
ance status of the facility will have a thor-
ough understanding of the pollution
caused by the processes at the facility.
The fact of addressing those processes,
and not merely accepting that on fifteen
dates in the last five years a violation
occurred, will bring a discharger into last-
ing Clean Water Act compliance.
Similarly, if an enforcement agency
receives a copy of a notice letter and
knows that only the dates and violations
specifically identified in the letter are
actionable by the plaintiff, it has no incen-
tive to investigate further, or to act during
the sixty day period.
As mentioned above, a citizen plain-
tiff may only pursue claims that are ongo-
ing on the day the suit is filed.121 If every
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120.  See discussion, supra Section II.
time a discharger changed his behavior, a
plaintiff had to send a new sixty-day
notice letter, Gwaltney will continuously
shield the discharger from suit by provid-
ing ever-renewing sixty-day periods.  The
mootness doctrine does not provide such
a shield because a citizen may secure
penalties to act as a general and a specif-
ic disincentive to future violations.  A dis-
charger could both avoid complying with
the Act and the meritorious citizen suit
that would enforce the Act.
This section of the article examines
the adequacy of notice letters in the fol-
lowing four hypothetical situations: 1) a
notice letter that identifies a violation of a
standard with which the defendant makes
an ineffectual attempt to comply during
the notice period; 2) a notice letter that
identifies the standards that apply under
a general permit under which the dis-
charger first secures coverage during the
notice period; 3) a notice letter that iden-
tifies “discharges that would not be
allowed under any permit” before
issuance of an individual permit; 4) a
notice letter that identifies one specific
discharge violation, which the discharger
changes during the sixty-day period.
These hypothetical situations should
facilitate an analysis of implementation of
the Act with respect to the current notice
requirements.
A.  Hypothetical One: Notice to a 
Non-Compliant Facility
A facility has not implemented good
housekeeping measures such as sweeping
and cleaning up material spills that would
be required by its permit.  A review at the
Regional Water Board of publicly avail-
able documents reveals that the discharg-
er’s pollutant management plan does not
mention the good housekeeping meas-
ures required by the facility permit.  The
citizen enforcer sends a notice letter alleg-
ing that the discharger has failed to devel-
op and implement an adequate manage-
ment plan, including failing to develop
and implement adequate housekeeping
measures.  The discharger then amends
its management plan to clarify that good
housekeeping is required.  The discharger
does not implement good housekeeping.
When the sixty-day period expires, citizen
enforcer files suit, alleging that good
housekeeping practices are not being
implemented.
This hypothetical situation occurs
commonly in the world of Clean Water Act
citizen enforcement.  A discharger who
receives a notice letter will often choose
to modify one or more of the areas of defi-
ciency identified in the notice letter.  If the
discharger’s modification to its behavior
does not succeed in bringing the dis-
charger into clear compliance, the citizen
enforcer will file suit to secure a court
order assuring compliance.
The court in Southwest Marine con-
fronted this basic set of facts and con-
cluded that the notice was adequate
because it made the discharger aware of
the deficiencies in its compliance.122 This
holding sets out two important principles.
First, the relevant date for adequacy of
notice is the date the notice letter is
mailed, not the date the complaint is
filed.  Second, the changes a discharger
makes to its pollution management plans
during the sixty-day period do not negate
the adequacy of a notice letter, and in fact
may be used as evidence that the letter
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was sufficient to alert the discharger to
the bases for the intended citizen suit.123
Dischargers sometimes cite their fail-
ure to come into full compliance with
their permits during the sixty-day period
as evidence of the inadequacy of the
notice letter.  They would argue that a suf-
ficient notice letter notifying them of the
standards they are violating would have
allowed them to cure the violations.
Southwest Marine firmly rejects this argu-
ment, stating to the contrary that a defen-
dant’s changing its SWPPP to include a
good housekeeping requirement during
the notice period is evidence that the
recipient understood exactly what the let-
ter was discussing.124
B.  Hypothetical Two: The Industrial
Non-Filer Cannot Escape Liability
by Filing for Coverage Under a
General Permit During the 
Sixty-Day Period
This hypothetical situation involves
an industrial discharger.  All facilities that
discharge storm water associated with
industrial activities must secure permit
coverage.125 The permitting authority
may issue general permits rather than
individual permits to each facility.126 For
example, California has issued such a
general permit.  In order to operate an
industrial facility that discharges storm
water in California, an operator must
either secure coverage under the General
Permit or apply for an individual NPDES
permit.  Like individual permits, general
permits are enforceable by citizens as
“effluent limits” under Section 305 of the
Act.127
In California, the general statewide
permit issued by the California State
Water Resources Control Board (“State
Board”) is both a Clean Water Act NPDES
permit and an order under California’s
Porter Cologne Water Quality Act.128 To
secure coverage under the General Permit
as an NPDES permit, industrial facilities
must submit notice of intent to be cov-
ered and an annual fee.  However, the
General Permit as an order applies to
large categories of industrial facilities,
stating “[t]his General Permit shall regu-
late storm water discharges and author-
ized non-storm water discharges from
specific categories of industrial facilities
identified in Attachment 1 . . . and storm
water discharges and authorized non-
storm water discharges from other facili-
ties seeking General Permit coverage.”129
As in the first hypothetical, this hypo-
thetical involves a facility that has not
implemented good housekeeping meas-
ures, such as sweeping and cleaning up
material spills, that would be required by
a General Permit, for which it qualifies.  A
review at the Regional Water Board dis-
closes no documents.  The discharger
never filed for coverage under the General
Permit or submitted any of the documents
required by the Permit.  The citizen plain-
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125.  Clean Water Act §402(p).
126.  40 C.F.R. § 122.28 (2003). 
127.  See Clean Water Act § 305.
128.  State Board Water Quality Order No. 91-13-
DWQ, NPDES General Permit No. CAS000001 –
Waste Discharge Requirements (“WDRs”) for
Discharges of Storm Water Associated with
Industrial Activities (“General Permit”).
129.  General Permit, Order No. 97-03-DWQ,
NPDES General Permit No. CAS000001 (1997),
Findings 2.
tiff sends a notice letter notifying the dis-
charger of plaintiff’s intent to sue for fail-
ure to obtain a permit and for operating in
violation of the General Permit.  The letter
describes the discharger’s failure to devel-
op and implement an adequate pollution
management plan, including failure to
develop and implement good housekeep-
ing practices.  On the 59th day of the
notice period, the discharger provides to
the citizen enforcer with evidence it has
filed for coverage under the General
Permit, and with a copy of discharger’s
application for coverage under the
General Permit and discharger’s newly-
minted management plan.  The manage-
ment plan contains an adequate good
housekeeping requirement.  No good
housekeeping is practiced before the expi-
ration of the sixty-day period.
Rather than sending a new notice let-
ter restating the allegation that the dis-
charger has failed to develop and imple-
ment an adequate management plan, the
plaintiff files a complaint, alleging failure
to implement an adequate management
plan.  A discharger might argue that the
violations were not occurring when the
notice letter was sent because the dis-
charger had not yet filed for coverage
under the General Permit, and therefore
there was not a sixty-day notice period.
A court should reject the discharger’s
argument, and hold that the notice both
satisfies the explicit regulatory require-
ments and effectuates the purposes of
notice.  To hold otherwise would create a
disincentive for dischargers to comply
with the law while rewarding those who
attempt to dodge their responsibilities by
allowing them to escape liability.
This situation has not yet been
addressed in any published decision.
However, in dicta in Southwest Marine, the
Court observed:
If a defendant receives a proper
notice letter alleging that it has
failed to prepare and implement
an adequate plan and, in
response, prepares a new plan
and begins to implement it before
the complaint is filed, is the oth-
erwise proper notice letter defec-
tive for failing to identify and dis-
cuss the new plan and its imple-
mentation? In those circum-
stances, must a citizen-plaintiff
send a new notice letter? We
think not. Subject matter juris-
diction is established by provid-
ing a notice that is adequate on
the date it is given to the defen-
dant.  The defendant’s later
changes to its operations and
plans may affect standing . . ., the
question of ongoing violations or
remedies . . ., or mootness . . .
But such changes do not retroac-
tively divest a district court of
jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. §
1365(b).130
In this hypothetical, the General
Permit establishes the conditions that the
facility must meet to operate in compli-
ance with the Clean Water Act.  Because
these conditions were adequately identi-
fied, the notice letter is sufficient to allow
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(emphasis added)(citations ommitted).
the discharger to deduce the standard it
has violated.131 Under Tosco, those viola-
tions occur every day of operation.132
The purposes of notice are served by
the Southwest Marine interpretation.  As dis-
cussed above, notice serves three purpos-
es: (1) to allow regulators to preempt a
citizen suit by enforcing the Act; (2) to give
a discharger the opportunity to come into
compliance before a citizen suit com-
mences; (3) and to give the citizen and the
discharger sixty days to settle before bur-
dening the courts with the action.  All
three purposes are achieved in this sec-
ond hypothetical, which adequately noti-
fies regulators of the alleged violations,
gives the discharger sixty days to file for
coverage and develop and implement an
adequate pollution management plan,
and gives the parties the full sixty days to
negotiate a settlement.
Further, public policy demands that
notice describing the violations suffice,
regardless of whether the facility has filed
for coverage.  The Act provides that any-
one who violates the Act is subject to
penalties not to exceed $27,500 per day
per violation.133 The most common way
to calculate the penalty is to add up the
number of days of each violation and mul-
tiply this number by $27,500, after which
the judge weighs a number of factors to
decide whether to reduce the penalty, and
if so, by how much.134 Every violation of a
permit condition is a violation of the Act.
For example, failure to develop adequate
housekeeping measures, a failure that
occurs every day until adequate house-
keeping measures are developed, is a
daily violation and subjects the facility to
a maximum penalty of $27,500 per day.
Failure to implement adequate house-
keeping measures is also a daily violation.  
An operator who files for coverage
and develops, but fails to implement ade-
quate housekeeping measures should not
be in a worse situation than a discharger
who never files for coverage at all.  This
sort of general amnesty to dischargers
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131.  This interpretation of the law is best applied in the
context of California’s General Permit, which the author
believes applies to categories of dischargers regardless of
whether they have applied for coverage under the
General Permit.  The General Permit is a bit like the speed
limit to a driver - it applies as soon as the discharger
starts doing business.  A discharger who does not apply
for General Permit coverage is violating the first require-
ment of the General Permit (to apply for coverage) but
also the other requirements, including preparing and
implementing a management plan.
This interpretation comes from a straight reading of
the Permit’s text.  Finding 2 of the Permit states that
“[t]his General Permit shall regulate storm water dis-
charges and authorized non-storm water discharges from
specific categories of industrial facilities identified in
Attachment 1 . . . .”  The introductory language to the
General Permit itself states: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that all facility operators required to be regulated by this
General Permit shall comply with the following . . . “
Finding 10 provides that “[f]acility operators are required
to comply with the terms and conditions of this General
Permit” without being contingent on application for cov-
erage.
By the Permit’s language, dischargers must comply
with the terms of the General Permit regardless of
whether they are covered.  For this reason, notice to a
non-filer that is covered by the General Permit should be
valid if it describes deficiencies in documents that the
non-filer has not yet developed.
132.  Tosco, 309 F.3d at 1158.
133.  Clean Water Act §309(d); see also 40 C.F.R. §
19.1-19.4.
134.  See Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point
Oil Co. Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 574-76 (5th Cir. 1996); Public
Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell
Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 80 (3rd Cir. 1990);
Atlantic States Legal Found. Inc., v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
897 F.2d 1128, 1142 (11th Cir. 1990); Atlantic States
Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co.,
786 F. Supp. 743, 746-47 (N.D. Ind. 1992).
who do not file the initial papers required
by the General Permit is very bad public
policy.  Such a policy would reward com-
plete failure to comply and punish unsuc-
cessful attempts at compliance.  It would,
in fact, discourage operators of industrial
facilities from filing for coverage until citi-
zen plaintiffs send a notice letters.
If the terms of the General Permit did
not apply across the board, even if the dis-
charger failed to file for coverage during the
60 day period, he would be liable only for
one violation - discharging without a permit
in violation of the Act - where his business
competitors who filed for coverage but did
not comply entirely would be liable for
numerous violations of the Act and the
Permit.  In addition, instead of sixty days
notice, a non-filer would have a minimum of
120-days notice - sixty days to file for cover-
age, after which Gwaltney would prevent a
citizen suit based on operations without a
permit, and another sixty days to come into
compliance with the General Permit after
the citizen plaintiff sends another notice let-
ter.  The discharger would also be spared the
annual filing fees and the accompanying
administrative burden.  Further, the dis-
charger would keep the public from access-
ing information concerning the facility’s dis-
charges, which all similarly-situated filers
must collect and submit to the water board.
As a final note, it would be very bad
policy to require a citizen enforcer who
previously sent a notice letter to a dis-
charger to re-send an identical letter just
because a facility operator filed for
General Permit coverage during the sixty-
day period.  This would essentially turn
the notice regulations into a reward sys-
tem for scofflaws.
C.  Hypothetical Three: Notice to a
Discharger With an Unpermittable
Discharge
In this case, the citizen enforcer
learns of a facility that is discharging pol-
lutants, but the facility does not qualify
for coverage under a general permit.  Such
a discharger must submit an application
for an individual NPDES permit under
Section 402 of the Act.  After receiving an
individual application, the permitting
authority will perform a series of analyses
of the pollutants proposed to be dis-
charged and the condition of the receiving
waters, and issue a permit that contains
monitoring and reporting requirements,
and effluent and receiving water limita-
tions.  Because the individual permit does
not yet exist, it is obviously impossible for
the citizen enforcer to identify the permit
limitation that is being violated.  In this
hypothetical, the enforcer sends notice
that the discharge is of a type that could
never be permitted under the Act, and
therefore violates any discharge permit
that may be issued to the discharger.
Under the Clean Water Act and its
implementing regulations, NPDES per-
mits may allow pollutant discharges.
However, no permit may be issued that
does not “provide for compliance with the
applicable requirements of CWA . . . .”135
One of the applicable requirements is that
no permit may be issued “when the impo-
sition of conditions cannot ensure com-
pliance with the applicable water quality
requirements of all affected States . . . .”136
Another limitation on NPDES permit-
ting is that dischargers must implement
best available technology (“BAT”) to con-
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135.  40 C.F.R. § 122.4.
136. Id.
trol the discharge of toxic pollutants and
best conventional technology (“BCT”) to
control the discharge of conventional pol-
lutants.137 The terms BAT and BCT are
somewhat deceptive.  They do not require
specific technology or treatment meas-
ures.  Instead, the Act requires the EPA to
“identify, in terms of amounts of con-
stituents and chemical, physical, and bio-
logical characteristics of pollutants, the
degree of effluent reduction attainable
through the application of the best . . .
technology.”138 Every discharger must
achieve the degree of effluent reduction
that the EPA determines is attainable,
regardless of what particular method or
technology is used to achieve that result.  
In a notice letter, a citizen enforcer
should be able to allege violations of
future permit prohibitions on discharges
without the required technology-based
effluent limits, as well as discharges that
are preventing compliance with applica-
ble water quality requirements.  These
allegations should be based on analyses
of samples of discharges from the site in
question that the citizen enforcer collect-
ed while investigating the discharger.
The notice letter would first allege
discharges of pollutants to waters of the
United States without a permit, in viola-
tion of Section 301 of the Act.  The letter
would next allege discharges of pollutants
that do not comply with a permit, in viola-
tion of Section 402 of the Act.  It should
then describe the restrictions that must
be included in every NPDES permit: pro-
hibition on discharges that prevent
achievement of applicable water quality
requirements and requirements for best
available and best conventional technolo-
gy to control pollutant discharges.139
Upon receipt of the notice letter, a
discharger could immediately apply for a
permit and might secure that permit dur-
ing the sixty-day period.  A court could
rely on Southwest Marine to conclude that
there was adequate notice because the
notice identifies the restrictions that are
being violated: failure to implement ade-
quate technology and failure to comply
with receiving water standards.  That
those restrictions did not become part of
the permit until after the notice letter was
sent does not change the fact that notice
was provided alerting the discharger and
the regulators that discharges were taking
place that violated the two restrictions
explicitly stated in the notice letter.  The
notice would be adequate because it did,
in fact, inform the discharger and the gov-
ernment regulators that the discharges
were taking place and were violating these
two, immutable standards.140
The purposes of notice are served by
the notice letter in this hypothetical situ-
ation. The notice letter alerts the dis-
charger that it is violating a standard (the
standard being the minimum standard
that any permit can contain and still be
valid under the Act) and gives the dis-
charger sixty days to permanently cease
the illegal discharge.  The discharger also
has the time to negotiate a settlement.
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137.  Clean Water Act § 307..
138. Id. at § 1314(b).
139.  40 C.F.R. 122.4, Clean Water Act § 307 respectively.
140.  This raises an important question: why not simply
sue to enforce the two NPDES- required restrictions?
Once a facility is operating under an NPDES permit, it
is extremely difficult to bring an enforcement action
under the Act without showing violations of the permit.
The Act provides that “[c]ompliance with a permit
issued pursuant to this section shall be deemed com-
pliance with . . . [the Act].” 40 C.F.R. § 1342(k).
More importantly, the regulatory agency
may initiate enforcement during the sixty-
day period and spare the citizen enforcer
the burden of bringing suit.
D.  Hypothetical Four: The Intersection
Between Southwest Marine and
Gwaltney
A discharger is violating a permit
limit on chlorine, which it uses in its
industrial processes.  Plaintiff sends a
notice letter that alleges violations of the
chlorine limit.  In response to the letter,
during the sixty-day period, the discharg-
er changes its processes to substitute
morine,141 which it discharges in excess of
permit limits for morine.  Plaintiff files
complaint alleging violations of the
morine limit.  
Under Southwest Marine this notice let-
ter will stand because it is adequate on
the day it is sent to notify the discharger
and enforcement agencies of the violation
Plaintiff is alleging.142 Southwest Marine
makes clear that a discharger’s change in
behavior subsequent to receipt of the
notice letter does not invalidate the
notice letter.143 The fact that the change
in behavior was caused by the notice let-
ter serves as evidence that the notice was
adequate.144
The three purposes of notice are
arguably served in this hypothetical situa-
tion.  The discharger obviously under-
stands that plaintiff intends to sue for its
discharge violations of chlorine limits,
and therefore shifts its behavior to violate
a different permit limit.  A defendant
would argue that while the shift in behav-
ior indicates adequate notice of chlorine
violations, there was no notice of morine
violations.  Under Southwest Marine, howev-
er, the only relevant question is whether
the letter gave notice of intent to sue on
the day it was sent, and subsequent
actions, especially by the discharger, can-
not invalidate that notice.145 The parties
have a full sixty days to settle their dis-
pute.  The agency is notified of chlorine
violations at the facility, and is entitled to
preempt a citizen enforcement action for
chlorine or any other violations the
agency discovers at the facility.  The prob-
lem does arise that the agency might
choose not to enforce the chlorine viola-
tions when it would take action for morine
violations.  However, the Bosma and Tosco
decisions conclude that violations that
are sufficiently similar to those in the
notice are within the sphere of notice.  An
agency that is concerned about morine
violations should be aware that morine
and chlorine are alternate solutions to the
same industrial problem if one can be
readily substituted for the other.  Such an
agency would be alerted to the possibility
of future morine violations when it
receives notice of chlorine violations.
That an adequate notice remains
adequate regardless of subsequent
behavior on the part of the discharger is of
limited practical import if the case will be
dismissed under Gwaltney.  Gwaltney
requires that the complaint allege a viola-
tion that is ongoing as of the day the
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141.  Morine is a fictional chemical, invented for
purposes of this hypothetical.
142.  See Southwest Marine, 236 F.3d at 997.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145.  This clarifies that the remedy for a discharger
who comes into compliance during the sixty day
period is a motion for summary judgment based
on Gwaltney or mootness, not dismissal based on
inadequate notice.
plaintiff files the complaint.146 Applying
the Gwaltney standard to this hypothetical,
we find that the complaint does allege an
ongoing violation of morine.  This some-
what counterintuitive conclusion - that an
adequate notice for one violation of the
Clean Water Act can support a suit for a
different violation of the Clean Water Act -
is fully supported by the case law dis-
cussed above.  The only relevant date for
adequacy of notice is the date the notice
is sent.147 The only relevant date for alleg-
ing ongoing violations in the complaint is
the date the complaint is filed.148
Therefore, the notice in this hypothetical
situation is adequate and cannot be inval-
idated by subsequent change in behavior
by the discharger, and the complaint is
adequate because there are, in fact ongo-
ing violations on the date it is filed.
V.  Conclusion
Congress intended notice to impose
only a minimal burden on Clean Water Act
plaintiffs. To enforce the Act effectively, a
citizen plaintiff must have the ability to
sue.  That ability should not be thwarted
by a discharger’s changes in behavior
designed to thwart an enforcement action
without ending the violations.  The impor-
tant lesson of recent cases is that the
courts will uphold a notice letter that pro-
vides sufficient information to allow the
recipient to deduce a plaintiff’s intent.  If a
notice letter is adequate on the day it is
sent, it does not subsequently become
inadequate.
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146.  Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64.
147.  See Southwest Marine, 236 F.3d at 997.
148.  Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64.
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C.W.A. Notice Requirement Resource Guide
1. Daniel J. Dunn, Environmental Citizen Suits Against Natural Resource Companies,
17-WTR Nat. Resources & Env't 161 (2003).
This article describes the citizen suit provisions of the major federal environmental
laws applicable to mining and oil and gas operations.
2. Headwaters
www.headwaters.org/cleanwater/cleanwatercampaign.php
Website for Headwaters, a group formed to conserve, protect, and restore forest
ecosystems, clean water, and biological diversity in the Klamath-Siskiyou Bioregion.
3. The Sierra Club
www.sierraclub.org/cleanwater
The Sierra Club's website, with reports, current issues, and factsheets about clean
water.
4. The EPA's Water Quality Criteria and Standards
www.epa.gov/OST/standards
This site addresses the program responsible for developing sound, scientifically
defensible standards, criteria, and guidelines that support state water quality pro-
grams.
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